

Indian State Capitalism and the Techno-Entrepreneur

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Abstract

In this paper, I examine the productivist role of the Indian state in the ongoing techno-entrepreneurial transformation of the Indian economy. I argue that while the Indian state was instrumental in the first IT boom of the 1990s, it now plays a much larger interventionist role in the contemporary transition. For instance, the Department of Industrial Policy has been revived after two decades of dormancy, and the Indian state is actively involved in directly targeting startups, granting exemptions, promoting strategic sectors, acting as a financier, and opening its scientific and research infrastructure to boost entrepreneurial activity. This stylized fact, however, gives rise to two paradoxes. First, the state's large interventionist role directly contrasts with the ruling political party's rhetoric of "minimum government" and the *California Ideology* underpinnings of the new entrepreneurial elite. Second, entrepreneurial policymaking also conflicts with the oligarchic system, in which the state's favored incumbent conglomerates have steadily concentrated large portions of economic activity since 2014. While the first contradiction can be explained by the global resurgence of industrial policymaking and state capitalism, I make sense of the second by highlighting the role of the state as a *coordinator*. Greater control over entrepreneurial activity through industrial policymaking allows the state to delineate the spheres of creative destruction within the startup economy while maintaining its mutually beneficial, symbiotic relationships with large business groups.

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1 Introduction

The State continues to play a significant role in Indian capitalism. Public Sector and State Owned Enterprises account for a substantial share of stock market valuations and remain among the country's largest employers (Chandra and Chatterjee, 2022). Their operations are complemented by powerful business groups—led by the Ambani and Adani families—forming a state-capitalist hybrid system. Despite Modi's criticism of National Rural Employment Guarantee programs and his rhetoric of "minimum government, maximum governance," a large portion of the population still relies on the State for employment and tangible goods through an extensive network of welfare schemes.

This is not to say that private firms operating in a more laissez-faire manner are absent or have not played a crucial role in the Indian economy. The late 1990s and early 2000s witnessed the remarkable rise of Indian Information and Communication Technology (ICT) firms, with back-end offices in Bangalore and Gurgaon catering to clients in the Western world. The role of the State in this exemplary rise is, however, contentiously debated. Former Chief Economic Advisor, Arvind Subramaniam, for instance, argues that "The ICT sector developed by virtue of its distance from, rather than proximity to, government". Whereas other like the late economist Ajit Singh disagree, and argue that the IT Industry in India developed "through strategic attention by the government to the needs of the industry at each successive developmental stage".

Often missing in this theorising of the State and Capitalist evolution is the ongoing techno-entrepreneurial startup boom, driven by a glut of venture capital and the direct import of business ideas. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has proclaimed that "Startups are going to be the backbone of New India"¹. The Indian urban landscape has been transformed by startups that were virtually non-existent a decade ago, offering services and products ranging from digital payments and satellite launches to on-call ambulances. The numbers are striking: in the early 2000s, India and China's share of global venture capital was nearly zero. Today, India attracts 5% of global VC funding, while China commands 38%. The Hurun Rich List reflects this shift—almost all new entrants without inherited wealth are startup founders. Entrepreneurship, once met with ambivalence in modern India, has now been glorified, with entrepreneurs elevated to Machiavellian heroes embodying Schumpeter's "supernormal will and intellect." The GUESSS India survey finds that in some engineering colleges, up to 32.5% of graduates aspire to become entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, the country's techno-entrepreneurial elite now socialize with political and entertainment figures, plan to contest elections², and engage in social media feuds—once a domain reserved for Bollywood stars.

What is the role of the Indian State—both its political and bureaucratic apparatus—if any, in this on-going transformation? Has the State also evolved from the socialist planning of the pre-1990s

¹Times of India, Jan 15, 2022

²Republic World, Feb 22, 2022

to the Washington Consensus of *stabilization, liberalization, and privatization* in the 1990s, and now, ultimately, to the Silicon Valley Consensus³, which further steps down the role of public intervention to just securing property rights and ensuring flexibility in factor allocation markets? Or perhaps the slowdown in the productivity growth, rising concentration and declining dynamism in the western economies, especially US, despite the promises of the Silicon Valley Consensus has meant that the new entrants in the digital revolution like India are charting an alternative State-led path much more closer to China?

The first argument of this paper is that the State remains far from obsolete in the high-tech developments of Indian capitalism. Despite the utopian vision of a minimal state in the California Ideology, the imperialism of free-market creative destruction theories in academic economics, and Narendra Modi's rhetoric of "minimum government, maximum governance," the State has played an active—and increasingly significant—role in fostering and planning the rise of techno-entrepreneurship. First, I examine the State's contributions to the first digital revolution of the 1990s, which led to the emergence of India's IT industry, highlighting its key role. Then, I present evidence that the State's role has expanded even further in the ongoing transformation—directly targeting startups, granting exemptions, promoting strategic sectors, acting as a financier, and opening its scientific and research infrastructure to a new generation of entrepreneurs.

The increasing productivist role of the Indian State and its techno-entrepreneurial policymaking present a paradox when juxtaposed with the characterization of the Indian economy as Oligarchic State Capitalism. As Chatterjee (2023) argues, the Modi administration has reinvented State Capitalism by replacing a porous state apparatus with a deeply symbiotic relationship between the government and two favored private conglomerates—Ambani and Adani—who have "flourished and spread their tentacles across the Indian economy." Within a Schumpeterian creative destruction framework, this arrangement faces a direct challenge if new entrants can innovate and capture market share from incumbent conglomerates. I address this paradox by arguing that the State has acted as a *coordinator*, effectively isolating the spheres of operation between the startup economy and the Ambani-Adani (AA) economy. However, the unprecedented concentration of economic power in a small group of business houses still has significant negative spillovers—especially hostile acquisitions of emerging firms, a trend led by Ambani's group in India.

Finally, I argue that while the State has actively mobilised in making policies to initiate and promote techno-entrepreneurial activity, it has lagged significantly in ensuring the equal distribution of the gains. India's *Billionaire Raj*⁴ makes it one of the most unequal countries in the world and despite the rise of the new entrants and creation of urban jobs by the startups, the working conditions of the gig-workers remain dismal. Additionally, the State's increasing role in tech startups raises concerns about the potential use of new technologies for surveillance and other political

³See Piore and Skinner (2019); Mazzucato (2011); Durand (2024)

⁴See Bharti et al. (2024)

agendas—especially under an increasingly nationalist and right-wing government.

2 Indian State and the First Digital Revolution

After liberalization and deregulation in the early 1990s, India experienced a rapid boom in IT services. In the early 2000s, India’s software services exports grew at an average annual rate of 30%, and today, the country holds approximately 11% of the global share in software exports. A key factor behind this success is India’s low-cost, highly skilled labor force, with salaries significantly lower than those of equivalent workers in the U.S. While there are a few contenders of the actual success of Indian IT industry, there remains a large debate over its origins.

As mentioned in the introduction, a strand of the literature argues that IT industry developed in India, in fact, due to the benign neglect of the government rather than a result of active policy (Joseph and Harilal, 2001). This strand argues that IT services fell out of the purview of traditional government regulations like labor laws and the Factories Act and hence they did not have to suffer the same burdens as manufacturing. As it was also free of bureaucratic incentives and red tapes, the argument goes, it were the true *laissez faire* market forces which led to the successful rise.

These arguments are, however, contentiously debated (Kapur, 2002; Balakrishnan, 2006; Singh, 2008). The most crucial input in the production of IT services is skilled labor. India was able to gain a comparative advantage primarily due to the abundance of inexpensive, skilled labor, which resulted from four decades of long-horizon investment by the Indian State in engineering colleges and higher education institutions across the country. The Indian State also played a pivotal role in establishing Software Technology Parks to overcome coordination and infrastructure challenges. Additionally, the mandatory export quotas facilitated knowledge diffusion by enabling Indian firms to learn from foreign customers and bypass domestic demand and knowledge constraints. The State’s central role in this development is evident spatially as well, with Bangalore emerging as the IT hub due to its dense concentration of scientific research and development institutions maintained by the Indian state⁵. Hence, it can rather be argued that the “the historical roots of the [IT] industry lie in state intervention” (Kapur, 2002) rather than the market.

While these policies are frequently cited as evidence of the State’s role in shaping the IT industry, there are other policies that have not received as much attention. Specifically, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act and the State’s direct intervention in providing tax breaks to promising firms played key roles. The MRTP Act was instrumental in ensuring the early dynamism of the IT industry by preventing large incumbent Indian firms from entering the sector

⁵The IT giant Wipro, for example, developed its first hardware computer system in the 1980s at the Indian Institute of Science’s Digital Systems Lab at the School of Automation. <https://connect.iisc.ac.in/2019/12/the-birth-of-wipros-computer-systems-business/>

and stifling small, young companies. Large business groups have historically dominated much of the Indian economy⁶, but the MRTP Act restricted these groups from expanding into new sectors⁷. As a result, apart from one MRTP-designated industrial house, the Tata Group, none of the early or later successful IT industry entrants were established incumbent firms. Second, even with the liberalization reforms of 1991, the State continued to employ traditional industrial policy tools, providing tax exemptions to exporting and other firms within the IT sector. This led to significantly higher markups—up to 30%—and has been argued to have played an important role in ensuring high entry rates and channeling funds back into future investments, promoting growth within the sector.

3 Interregnum and the Silicon Valley Imperialism

Coinciding with the first digital revolution in the 1990s, the nature of Indian State Capitalism also underwent multiple changes. The Liberalization-Privatization-Globalization (LPG) project dismantled the traditional planning framework and gave way to policies generally aligned with the Washington Consensus. This shift also marked the demise of the Industrial Policy—at least in the way it had been traditionally implemented over the previous four decades. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1991 was the last such policy adopted by India.

This three-decade-long project of liberalization has been far from linear. Large-scale privatizations have faced significant political resistance, as have reforms in the agricultural and labor markets. The shift has instead been seen in the role of public enterprises, which have transitioned from focusing on industry to infrastructure and finance. Most of them have also been opened up to competition from the private sector but still remain as one of the largest employers in India. Politically, deregulation and privatization agenda saw a smooth transfer of power from the Indian National Congress to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) during its first extended period of governance from 1998 to 2004, under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Though neither the BJP nor its ideological affiliate, the RSS, ever specified a clear economic agenda, their traditional valorization of private ownership—along with Gandhian preferences for small-scale, appropriate technology over heavy industry, frugality over consumerism, and decentralization over big business(Chatterjee, 2023)—took on a more business-friendly tone as their rank-and-file drew support from the growing middle class, disillusioned with the Congress. This pro-business sentiment ultimately found its champion in Narendra Modi, first as the Chief Minister of Gujarat and later as the Prime Minister of India, running election campaigns on slogans like “Government has no business being in business” and “minimum government, maximum governance” (Chatterjee, 2023).

In parallel to these changes in India, the world hegemon of the capitalist system, the United

⁶For a general overview of business groups in developing countries, see Khanna and Yafeh (2007)

⁷Any firm with assets over 100 crore was prohibited from entering new sectors, except for a few specifically listed (Chakravathy, 2010; Shapiro, 2012)

States, also experienced significant reversals in trends that had characterized the post-war period of prosperity and unhindered growth. Long-term productivity growth in the U.S. decoupled from wages, labor share began to fall, market concentration rose, and business dynamism declined⁸. This period also saw manufacturing gradually move out of the U.S. and toward China, contributing to the decline of the Rust Belt and the loss of long-term stable jobs, along with the erosion of labor unions. Iconic manufacturing American corporations like Ford and General Motors eventually faded from their once-dominant positions. Meanwhile, the ups and downs from the Volcker shock and the dot-com bubble paved the way for the rise of Big Finance and Big Tech.

“Silicon Valley is an island of freedom and free markets, more in line with the 1776 America and its laissez-faire government than the America today with its interventionist government,” remarked T.J. Rodgers, the founder of Cypress Semiconductors, in 2000, making the case for tech companies to fight against antitrust laws⁹. Silicon Valley and the California ideology were at the heart of the rise of Big Tech. While the origins of the early pioneering firms in the valley can be traced back to research and funding efforts by the U.S. military and government (Lerner, 2009; Mazzucato, 2011), it was the eventual emergence of the Venture Capital industry that provided the risky capital for high-potential startups. The largest tech giants of today—Meta, Google, Amazon, and Elon Musk’s companies—were all financed by venture capitalists rather than through traditional debt or equity financing. The venture capital industry soon surpassed the \$100 billion annual investment mark and gained disproportionate influence on both the U.S. economy and political outcomes¹⁰.

The ideological underpinnings of the prevalent, and ultimately exported, cultural and political mood of Silicon Valley lie in the counterculture of the 1960s, coupled with the eventual embrace of free-market principles and Chicago School economics by California’s entrepreneurs and financiers (Davis, 2017). This ideology differed significantly from the versions of the Washington Consensus championed by the U.S. government and propagated by institutions like the World Bank and IMF in India and other parts of the Global South. As Durand (2024) argues, “[California ideology] placed more emphasis on the dynamic efficiency of capitalism, as a movement of creative destruction, than on the static efficiency of resource allocation by the market. In doing so, this doctrine extended its prescriptions beyond the stabilization-liberalization-privatization triptych, putting incentives at center-stage. Henceforth, the public policies characteristic of the Silicon Valley consensus were guided by principles such as minimal public intervention, freeing entrepreneurial energies, flexibility in product, labor, and capital markets, and protecting innovators’ property rights.” Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency is the epitome of material outcome of this ideology.

⁸See Decker et al. (2016); Akcigit and Ates (2021)

⁹See <https://www.cato.org/policy-report/may/june-2000/tj-rodgers-warns-silicon-valley-stay-out-dc>

¹⁰VC-backed firms account for a disproportionate share of employment, revenue, and IPOs in the U.S. (Puri and Zarutskie, 2012). U.S. Vice President JD Vance worked for multiple venture capital firms before running for the Senate in Ohio.

Imperial Expansion of the Silicon Valley Venture Capitalism: The euphoria of a Startup led culture of innovation and growth was short lived in the US. Backed by a string of hostile mergers and acquisitions, the imperative of capital valorization instead turned into an appetite of eating up other small firms and killing competition. The big tech firms that emerged out of this revolution have been dubbed in popular economics as protagonists of a post-capitalistic transition of the American society into techno-feudalism (Durand, 2024; Varoufakis, 2024; Morozov, 2022). Venture capitalists soon realized that, while opportunities in the U.S. were dwindling, the growing incomes and rising consumer demand in developing countries presented a new opportunity. This shift indicated that the success of U.S.-based firms could easily be exported to the global markets of the South, marking the phase of venture capital globalization. This form of financing, which had traditionally been unavailable to firms in developing countries, expanded globally in the early 2000s.

In the 1980s, the U.S. held 85% of venture capital investments, with Europe holding the remaining 15%. However, by the late 2010s, the U.S. share had fallen below 50%. China emerged as the largest economy with a high appetite for venture financing, and India—despite having only one-fifth of China’s per capita GDP—closely followed. From a nearly non-existent venture capital market, India’s share steadily rose to above 5% by the early 2010s.

Both China and the U.S. served as models for the growth of VC-backed entrepreneurship in India. Indian entrepreneurs sought direct inspiration from startups in these countries, while investors relied on past successes as blueprints for launching new ventures in new geographies (Lerner et al., 2024). For example, Flipkart and Ola closely imitated Amazon and Uber from the U.S., while Byju’s, an educational technology startup, drew inspiration from China’s Yuanfudao. This phenomenon also led to the rise of a new entrepreneurial elite in India, enabled by technical education and often shaped by direct experiences in Silicon Valley culture—whether through on-site visits or working in the back-end offices of firms in Bangalore or Gurgaon. In the early 2010s, this industry grew at over 30% per year, directly employing 2 million highly skilled workers, with at least four times that number working as low-skilled contractual workers in the rapidly expanding gig economy.

4 Second Digital Revolution

I argue that this period marks the beginning of the second IT revolution in India. While many early entrepreneurs directly imported ideas from the U.S. and created Indian replicas of U.S. and Chinese firms, others identified local problems and leveraged the abundant, cheap unskilled labor to establish rapidly growing companies. For example, the digital payments ecosystem grew organically in India, although it was heavily supported by government interventions in the payment stack and the Aadhaar technology linking bank accounts with payment applications. Additionally, India is witnessing the emergence of a large and successful space technology sector,

alongside growing firms in AI, biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals. The availability of financing has also evolved. Initially, it was U.S. and European venture capitalists who provided early capital investments, but over time, a significant number of domestic VCs have emerged. The success of startups has also contributed to the rise of wealth among business families, leading to a sharp increase in family offices and boutique investment firms.¹¹.

4.1 Paradox I: Silicon Valley Consensus and the Indian State Capitalism

What, then, has been the role of the Indian State? Given Narendra Modi's business-friendly, pro-rich, and minimum government policies, alongside Ayn Rand-inspired free-market venture capitalists and startup founders, one might expect an equilibrium outcome of minimal state intervention. Paradoxically, however, the Indian State plays an active role, not just in ensuring property rights, but in selecting and supporting strategic industries and startups. It provides direct funding, R&D support, and large-scale school intervention programs — adopting an industrial policy approach that diverges from both the Washington consensus and the Silicon Valley model.

While the role of the Indian State in the first IT revolution is contentiously debated as the State itself never rolled out a strategy for the growth of the sector but rather assisted the sector with a dis-joint set of interventions. It is not the case this time. Startup India program, Atal Innovation Mission, PM Mudra Yojana, Seed Fund Scheme, Billion dollar Fund of Funds, National Deep Tech Policy and the currently in draft National Industrial Policy 2025 all lay out very clearly the bold and the interventionist role that the Indian state wants to play in the development of new tech-enterprises.

Industrial Policy for the Knowledge Economy The erstwhile Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, which had remained almost dormant for two decades, was rebranded as the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade in 2019 and has since launched a series of policies. It has rolled out a number of intervention programs aimed at selecting and promoting startups and strategic industries. While these interventions mirror some of the policies from the first IT revolution—such as tax exemptions and R&D collaborations with government bodies—they also introduce new measures inspired by the academic economic literature of the past two decades¹² The key principle in the rationale for these policies is economic efficiency and hence come with sunset clauses so that the firms cannot capture the benefits perpetually. However, they also have strategic goals on top of the efficiency arguments. For instance, the discussions in the Inter-Ministerial Board meeting minutes evaluating startup firms often cite the “importance of the sector” as reason for approving startups in renewable energy, AI, health etc

¹¹See, for example, <https://inc42.com/features/decoding-family-offices-landscape-in-india/>

¹²See Chapter 3 of the Indian Economic Survey 2018-19 and its references to Hsieh and Klenow (2014); Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2009) etc.

sector¹³.

Tax Exemptions and the Bureaucratic Process The tax exemptions provided to the startups work within the traditional bureaucratic apparatus. An Inter-Ministerial Board evaluates the applications of all the startups and then decides to provide an exemption or reject the firm. The criteria has been vaguely specified as creation of wealth or generation of employment. The government, however, is cautious about the traditional connotations associated with Industrial Policy such as corruption and political capture. As a result, all the meeting board minutes have been made public and the exemptions come with a number of clauses. The firms can only get an exemption for any three consecutive years within the first ten years of their formation and can only take the benefits if they were formed after 1st April 2016.

Government as a Venture Capitalist The Indian government launched a corpus of a 1.5 billion dollar fund of funds for startups, a 100 million dollar fund for the space tech sector, and similar large amounts for AI and other strategic sectors. While most developed countries have such funds, the scale of this financing in India is completely unprecedented. However, the government does not directly pick the startups to fund; instead, it invests in Alternate Investment Funds (AIFs) that pledge to contribute twice the amount paid by the government. These AIFs also select and monitor startups for their performance and eventual exit. In China, for example, the government is a minority stakeholder in a large fraction of firms precisely because of the role it plays as a venture capitalist. However, firms in China have mixed perceptions of government investment (Colonnelli, Li, and Liu, 2024). In India, so far, there has been little research on the impact of government financing.

Incubators In the first IT revolution, the Indian tech giant Wipro created its first computer hardware design at a lab in the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore. The current government has pushed almost all scientific institutions in India to set up incubators and accelerators inspired by prominent private sector ventures such as Y-Combinator and Creative Destruction Lab. These incubators provide guidance, mentorship, and funding, especially in capital- and infrastructure-intensive technologies like biotechnology and space technology. For example, the C-CAMP incubator in Delhi has supported firms like String, which develops synthetic biotechnology solutions for waste carbon recycling. The FSID at IISc has incubated pioneering space-tech startups such as Bellatrix Aerospace.

4.2 Paradox II: The Oligarchs and the Entrants

The Indian state has re-invented and invigorated its agenda of developing strategic and important technological sectors by investing in and supporting new-age entrepreneurs. This, however, stands in stark contrast to the characterization of the Indian economy as an oligarchic system dominated by two key conglomerates: Ambani and Adani. The oligarchic practices find strong

¹³In forthcoming work, Chhina (2025) I study the selection criteria and the impact of the tax exemption policies

support in both data and the actions of the Indian government. The fortunes of Ambani and Adani rose sharply in tandem with the rise of Modi, and a system of mutual benefits has built economic and political capital for both parties. The BJP has gained not only donations but also, through the two conglomerates, has overcome some of India's large infrastructure bottlenecks — at the cost of increasing monopolistic controls (Chatterjee, 2023). The owners of the two firms represent one of the most concentrated centers of wealth in the world, and the wealth inequality and concentration of wealth among the top business houses has only increased since 2014.¹⁴

The promotion of entrepreneurship, on the other hand, poses a direct challenge to the fortunes of the incumbents. In the theory of creative destruction, it is only through the replacement of incumbents by innovating entrants that productivity gains materialize. Therefore, it would seem that these two roles of the Indian State would be contradictory to each other. However, a closer look reveals another role of the Indian State: that of an innovation *coordinator*. For instance, in a laissez-faire, perfect competition economy, the innovation directions of entrepreneurs would be distributed symmetrically across all industries. However, a state-led path to entrepreneurship, while helping to overcome certain market failures, also implies that the State can more closely control and manage entrepreneurial activity. In practice, this means the isolation of entrepreneurial spheres. Innovation and entrepreneurship are encouraged, but only if they are orthogonal to the interests of the State's favored conglomerates.

Another mechanism through which the oligarchic economy stands as a roadblock to entrepreneurship is via direct stifling of entrepreneurial activity. The most common tool utilised by monopolists to push down competition is mergers and acquisitions. And perhaps without any surprise, Reliance Industries and Reliance Retail, part of the Ambani group, are the top acquirers of startups in India. The two subsidiaries have acquired over forty startups in the last couple years which double the amount of the next leader in acquisition, Flipkart.

5 Regulating the Leviathan

A rise in entrepreneurship and the formation or formalization of new enterprises may certainly lead to gains in allocative efficiency and average productivity for the economy, but there is no guarantee of a prosperity bandwagon. Indeed, it has rarely been the case that new technologies automatically lead to shared prosperity; rather, it has always been the power struggle between the owners of the technology and the rest that determines who gains and who loses (Johnson and Acemoglu, 2023). Thus, one role of the State is to ensure that the distribution of the gains is justly shared between the owners of the technology and the workers whom the technologies either replace or complement. By promoting entrepreneurship, it might seem that the State could encourage upward mobility and induce churn among the top holders of wealth. However,

¹⁴See Bharti et al. (2024) and https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/3a_Acharya-BEPA-presentation-March-30-2023-v2.pdf

as discussed in the previous sections, the Indian State has conveniently separated the oligarchic and entrant activities—safeguarding the interests of the conglomerates.

Within the sphere of high-tech entrepreneurship, the Indian State has implemented only a limited set of policies to ensure the sharing of gains with workers. For instance, once a startup is recognized by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, it is exempt from all labor and environmental laws. The gig economy, born out of the entrepreneurial boom, has created jobs, but the vast majority of India's 7.7 million gig workers work more than ten hours a day while earning less than Rs. 20,000 a month.¹⁵ Additionally, large-scale ecological changes have worsened working conditions, with extreme heatwaves becoming more frequent and severe in recent years. Thus, despite its multiple paradoxes, Indian state capitalism appears to have settled on a path of promoting techno-entrepreneurs while maintaining its persistent oligarchic and unequal structures.

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¹⁵See Impact of Extreme Heat on Gig Workers: A Survey Report, August 2024, conducted by Telangana Gig and Platform Workers Union (TGPWU) & HeatWatch. https://tgpwu.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Impact_of_Extreme_Heat_on_Gig_Workers_A_Survey_Report-1.pdf

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